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Abstract
starting and current salaries of 3,564 men and 1,053 women hired
between 1976 and 1986 by a large, private firm were examined. Using a
comprehensive model including year of hire, potential experience, education
degree, college major, firm tenure, performance, and job title, men were
found to have 5.8% higher current salaries. Among college graduates, men
~alized a 2.9% current salary advantage. Further analyses suggested that
the bulk of the current salary disadvantage of women could be attributed
to a one-time salary shortfall incurred at the time of hire. Although
among college graduates, for example, differences in college major explained
much of the starting salary advantage for men, an unexplained 4.8% advantage
in starting salaries remained. Although women were more likely to leave
the firm, correction for this potential source of sample selection bias
did not change the pattern of results. Finally, we suggest that the fact
that women experience a greater salary disadvantage at entry may stem from
the smaller amount of job-relevant information available for applicants
relative to current employees.
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3In reviewing research on pay differences between men and women, Treiman
and Hartmann (1981) concluded that "worker characteristics account for
very little of the difference in earnings (p. 19)". Gender-related
differences in demand side factors, -mainly the occupational distribution,
were found to explain a larger part of the earnings gap. Nevertheless,
after adjusting for both supply and demand side factors, a substantial
portion of the earnings differential between men and women remains (see
also the review by Cain, 1986). The remaining portion of the pay
differential is taken as evidence of (a) labor market discrimination against
women and/or as (b) indicative of researchers' inability to identify,
measure, and control for all aspects of worker productivity.
Several problems, however, characterize this stream of research.
First, the data typically represent a snapshot at one point in time of
what is really a dynamic process. This lack of attention to the dynamics
of pay-setting may cause researchers to miss key elements of the process.
Thus, for example, using cross-sectional firm level data, Gerhart and
Milkovich (1987) found a salary disadvantage for women, after controlling
for several factors including education and experience, consistent with
much previous research. In sharp contrast, however, using longitudinal
data from the same firm, Gerhart and Milkovich found that women actually
received more promotions and larger percentage salary increases over a
six year period than did men. As a result, the raw salary differential
decreased over this period. These latter findings suggested a different
picture of pay-setting vis-a-vis gender in this firm.
Second, key factors on both the supply and demand side have been
neglected. On the supply side, for example, men and women are unequally
4distributed across fields of study in college (Polachek, 1978). It is
also the case that different college majors have different average starting
salaries. Consistent with these observations, Daymont and Andrisiani (1984)
have found that differences between men and women in college major
significantly contribute to the earnings gap. Their study, however, used
a sample of new entrants to the labor market. Some question remains as
to whether college major plays such a key role among cohorts having more
labor market experience (Blau & Ferber, 1986).
On the demand side, work content is an important, but neglected factor.
Sanborn (1964) and Fuchs (1971) were among the first to stress the
importance of the unequal distribution of men and women across occupations
and jobs in explaining pay differences. Study of the role of work content
has, however, been hampered by the lack of firm level data. Using national
survey data, the most precise occupational classification is usually at
the 3-digit census level. However, evidence suggests that the actual work
content of jobs varies widely within 3-digit occupations (see Gerhart,
forthcoming for a review). Firm level data has the potential to provide
more precise control for differences in job content.
A final neglected factor is the performance of men and women in
specific jobs in specific firms. This performance is likely to be a result
of the quality of the match between the person (supply characteristics)
and the job (demand characteristics). Most firms rely heavily on
performance ratings in making pay allocation decisions.2 Therefore,
inclusion of performance measures would appear to be an important ingredient
in understanding the pay-setting process for men and women.
A third general problem with existing research on the pay gap has
5been the lack of attention to the role of specific human resource activities
in generating pay differentials between men and women. Rather, most
empirical research has relied on aggregate data on workers in many different
and unknown firms. Yet, as Milkovich and Newman (1987) have argued, such
research "must [instead] be performed at the level at which wages are
set Inferring and evaluating from aggregate data is misleading" (p.
498) . Similarly, Hartmann, Roos, and Treiman (1985) emphasized that "We
need to understand better how wages are set within enterprises and how
they are affected by other employer practices..." (p. 7). A step in this
direction was taken by Gerhart and Milkovich (1987) in their examination
of promotion and salary increase decisions. Given their finding of an
advantage for men in current pay levels, but an advantage for women in
promotions and pay increases, they speculated that if discrimination does
operate in pay-setting, it may do so at the time of entry into the firm.
Given evidence of a preference against women in hiring decisions
(Olian, Schwab, Haberfeld, forthcoming), lower starting salaries for women
seem plausible. Indeed, neoclassical economic models suggest that employer
discrimination is eliminated in the market through the competitive advantage
realized by firms that hire equally qualified employees from the
disadvantaged group at lower salaries.3
One reason to expect a larger disadvantage for women in starting rather
than current salary stems from the differing amounts of productivity
information available on applicants compared with current employees. Nieva
and Gutek (1980), for example, have argued that different human resource
evaluations require different degrees of inference and that "the greater
the amount of inference required...the more likely it is that evaluation
7Under such circumstances, Aigner and Cain (1977) suggest the
possibility that individual women who know their expected productivity
is being misjudged may temporarily accept a lower salary than a comparable
man in order to obtain the opportunity for a trial work period, thereby
having the opportunity to demonstrate their true productivity. Based on
this new and perhaps more directly job relevant information, salaries for
such women may rise to correspond to revised productivity judgments.
The present study uses firm level data to examine the magnitude and
possible causes of differences in starting and current salaries of newly
hired men and women. Because the data are collected at the firm level,
measures of key supply and demand side factors are available. On the supply
side, standard measures of the amount of human capital (e.g. educational
attainment) are used. In addition, a measure of the kind of human capital
(Polachek, 1981), college major, is included for those with college degrees.
On the demand side, job content is controlled through the use of job titles.
Finally, performance level is controlled through inclusion of average
performance rating since time of hire.
The model to be tested distinguishes between attributes that can be
measured prior to firm entry versus those that can be measured only after
an applicant becomes an employee. The structural model is as follows:
Current Salary = f(starting salary, firm tenure, performance, job
title, gender)
Starting Salary =' f(year of hire, general experience, education
degree, college major, gender).
The reduced form equation for current salary is then:
Current Salary = f(year of hire, general experience, education
8degree, college major, firm tenure,
performance, job title, gender).
INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
The data apply to exempt employees of a firm that produces a
diversified set of industrial and consumer products.s Compensation
policies and practices of the firm are typical of those in the Fortune
500. For example, the firm participates in over 6 annual salary surveys
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for jobs included in the present study. Some focus on selected product
market competitors, others focus on labor market competitors. Although
statistical methods are used to combine the results of surveys, considerable
judgment is also exercised because of different degrees of confidence placed
on the results of the various surveys. This is consistent with Rynes and
Milkovich's (1986) argument that ad hoc judgments are typically made
throughout the process.
An explicit pay-far-performance policy exists for the determination
of individual pay increases. The policy is implemented through the use
of annual merit increase guides (see Milkovich & Newman, 1987 for some
examples) . Performance is assessed through a formal, annual performance
appraisal process.6 The immediate supervisor rates each employee on a
4-point scale with 4 being the highest performance level. The numerical
rating is supplemented by a written description of the subordinates
performance during the year. The complete appraisal is typically reviewed
by a higher level manager.
In equal employment opportunity (EEO), the firm's standard training
for its managers included materials on EEO compliance with respect to
staffing, access to training, compensation, and performance appraisal.
f9
The inclusion of EEO issues in training programs is typical of large firms.7
Corporate personnel monitored managers' actions in these areas and
encouraged improvement in those displaying subpar performance.
More on the institutional setting can be found in Gerhart and Milkovich
(1987).
METHOD AND ANALYSES
Exempt employees hired between 1976 and 1986 are the focus of the
present study.8 Some exempt employees at the highest levels are excluded
because of a lack of information. The final sample includes 4,617 employees
(3,564 men and 1,053 women). Of these, 2,895 employees (2,281 men and
641 women) held a Bachelor's degree or higher. Professional, managerial,
sales, and technical jobs are the major broad categories. Examples of
common job titles include engineer, customer representative, technologist,
office supervisor, production supervisor.
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CUrrent (1986) and starting (in 1986 dollars) salary are the endogenous
variables. In both cases, the natural logarithm transformation is used.
The first set of exogenous variables, referred to as human capital
(HC) variables in this study, are potential labor market experience (age -
years of schooling - 6)9, its square, and education dummies for highest
degree. These measures are taken at the time of first entry to the firm.
In addition, dummy variables are used for year of hire.
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The second set of factors are 65 dummy variables for college major.
These are based on the person's highest degree at the time of entry to
the firm. Of course, as discussed earlier, college major can be thought
of as a measure of the kind of human capital.
The third set of exogenous variables are those measured within the
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firm such as tenure10 (and its square). To measure differences in job
content, 60 dummy variables corresponding to job titles are used.
Performance history is measured by including the average of performance
ratings received since commencing employment with the firm. Gender is
measured using a dummy variable (men = 1, women = 0).
Mean age at the time of hire was 28.5 years for men, 27.7 years for
women. The mean age as of 1986 was 33.8 years for men, 32.8 years for
women. Mean tenure was 5.5 years for men, 5.1 years for women. Mean
potential experience at time of hire was 7.3 years for men, 7.0 years for
women. By 1986, mean potential experience was 12.7 years for men, 12.0
years for women.11 Finally, the average performance rating was 2.46
(on a 1 to 4 scale with 4 being the highest rating) for both men and women.
Ordinary least squares is used to estimate the reduced form equation
for current salary. In estimating the structural model, however, two stage
least squares is used to account for any correlation between starting salary
and the error term in the current salary equation.
RESULTS
Table 1 reports mean current and starting salaries for men and women.
In the full sample, the women/men salary ratio was lower for starting salary
than for current salary. In the case of college graduates, the ratios
were similar for starting and current salary. Note, however, that these
raw ratios do not control for the fact that different numbers of men and
women were hired in different years under different labor market conditions.
Table 2 reports estimates of the gender coefficient in the current
and starting salary equations under different reduced form specifications.
In the full sample, controlling only for year of hire, men had a 12.3%
11
higher current salary. This advantage is, however, smaller than the 18.9%
advantage men realized in starting salaries (in 1986 dollars). Among
college graduates, although the advantage of men is smaller for both
starting and current salary, the pattern is the same in that men's greatest
advantage is in starting salary. These findings suggest support for the
hypothesis that the raw salary level disadvantage of women occurs largely
at the time of hire.
Adding standard human capital variables (education degree and potential
experience) reduces the gender coefficient in both the starting and current
salary equations across samples. Of special note, the introduction of
dummy variables for college major further reduces the coefficient by an
important amount in the sample of college graduates. The effect of
controlling for potential experience, education degree, and college major
is to reduce the gender coefficient by 1 - .086/.123 = 30% for current
salary, and by 1 - .122/.189 = 35% for starting salary in the full sample.
Among college graduates, the corresponding reductions are 1 - .046/.094
= 51% for current. salary, and 1 - .048/.133= 63% for starting salary.
Similarly, among college graduates, introduction of college major results
in a substantial increase in the R2 of the starting salary equation. The
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increment is less for current salary, consistent with the notion that the
organization has access to what it deems more relevant measures of
performance after an applicant becomes an employee.
The remaining exogenous variables are observed only for employees
(versus applicants), and thus are relevant only for the current salary
equations. As Table 2 indicates, the addition of firm tenure only slightly
increases the explanatory power of the models for current salary and does
12
not change the gender coefficient by much.
In contrast, introduction of average performance rating leads to a
relatively large increment in the R-square, suggesting that it does play
an important role in pay-setting. However, consistent with Gerhart and
Milkovich's finding, gender differences in average performance rating are
not an important determinant of pay differences between men and women.
The final row in Table 2 shows the result of adding dummy variables
for job title to the models for current salary. This addition results
in a substantial increase in the R-square in both samples. Nevertheless,
the coefficients on gender remain positive and statistically significant
and indicate that men's salaries are still 5.8 % higher on average than
women's in the full sample, 2.9 % higher on average among college graduates.
In raw dollars, this translates into an advantage of $2,160 for men in
the full sample, and an advantage of $1,095 for men in the sample of college
graduates. In view of the relatively comprehensive list of control
variables, these amounts are substantial.
Estimates for the structural model appear in Tables 3 (full sample)
and 4 (college graduates sample). In both Tables, the first 3 columns
pertain to a model that does not include gender in the starting salary
equation. In contrast, the last 3 columns of both Tables describe a model
where a gender effect is included in the starting salary equation. In
both cases, the current salary equation is estimated with and without the
job title dummies in recognition of the possibility that job title
assignment may not be completely exogenous to gender.
The general story in Tables 3 and 4 is that gender has its largest
impact on starting salaries. Further, controlling for this effect
13
substantially reduces the impact of gender on current salaries. For
example, Table 3 shows that starting salaries were 12.2 % higher for men.
Introducing this effect for gender reduces men's advantage in current
salaries from 8.7% to 2.9% in the equation without control for job titles.
Similarly, among college graduates, the starting salary advantage for men
was 4.8%., compared to 1.4% for current salary (reduced from 3.8%).
Inclusion of the job title dummies does not change this general pattern.
One concern with these results is the possibility that the sample
of men and women used is the result of a selection process that may be
related to gender and the salary determination process, perhaps biasing
the parameter estimates in the preceding models. To address this issue,
an approach described by Heckman (1976) was followed. First, a selection
equation that models the probability of being included in the sample is
required. Second, a correction term is constructed that indicates the
probability of exclusion from the sample. The substantive equation is
then estimated with this correction term included as an independent
variable. To estimate the selection equation, information on persons
excluded from the sample is necessary. Fortunately, the firm was able
to supply supplemental data covering most of the time period of interest
(persons hired between 1976 and 1984). Although this supplemental database
did not include information on some key variables (e.g. education),
information was available on several factors that typically influence
turnover.
The results shown in the first column of Table 5 suggest that women
I
I
I
I
are less likely to be employed as of 1984 than men. Also, more likely
to leave are younger employees, those with higher starting salaries, and
14
those. with lower average performance ratings. The relation between
performance and turnover is consistent with other emerging research in
this area (Bishop, 1988; McEvoy & Cascio, 1987).12 The second column in
Table 5 indicates that there is also an interaction between gender and
starting salary.:t3 The nature of the interaction is such that higher
starting pay is associated with more turnover for women, less turnover
t.°r men. Finally, although new hires typically have the highest turnover
rates, note that only 1763 out of 8344 employees hired between 1976 and
1984 had separated from the organization by the end of 198414.
To determine the effect of the selection process on the substantive
model, the selection model estimated on persons hired during the 1976-1984
period was assumed to also describe the selection process for persons hired
during the slightly longer 1976-1986 period. Table 6 reports the gender
coefficients obtained after re-estimating the structural model with a
correction for sample selection bias. A comparison of the top half of
Table 6 with Table 4 and the bottom half of Table 6 with Table 5 suggests
that the coefficients on gender change only slightly, leaving unchanged
the general pattern of results.
Finally, given the key role of starting salary differentials, a
standard decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Jones, 1983) was performed to more
precisely determine what factors contributed to these differentials. The
results are shown in Table 7. Consistent with the other analyses, college
major plays an important role, accounting for 30% of the pay differential.
Note, however, that it is the unequal distribution of men and women across
majors, not unequal returns to specific majors that contributes to the
pay differential. In fact, women tend to receive slightly higher returns
15
than men across majors. The bottom of Table 7 shows the percentage of
the pay gap accounted for by the 10 college majors having the most men
and women. Two majors, mechanical engineering and electrical engineering
account for most of the effect of college major.
DISCUSSION
The current study provides two key findings. First, despite a
comprehensive group of control variables, women experienced a significant
disadvantage in terms of both starting and current salaries. Second, the
current salary disadvantage was largely a result of a one-time salary
shortfall for women occurring at the time of hire. These findings provide
direct support for recent suggestions (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1987; Megdal
& Ransom, 1985) that starting salary differences playa major role in
current salary differentials between men and women. Additional supportive
empirical evidence has also begun to appear (e.g. a study of University
of Pittsburgh MBA graduates by Olson, Frieze, & Good, 1987).
College major was found to be a key determinant of differences between
men and women in starting salaries, consistent with results obtained by
Daymont and Andrisiani (1984). In the college graduates sample, the
addition of college major reduced the salary advantage of men by almost
one-half, even after controlling for standard human capital variables.
Nevertheless, a 4.9% advantage for men in starting salaries remained.
In raw dollars, this translates into a difference of $1,307, again a
substantial amount in view of the relatively extensive list of control
variables in the model.
We were also able to assess the effect of key firm level variables
on current salaries. Average performance rating, for example, had a
16
substantial impact on current salaries, but did not help explain salary
differences between men and women. Job title also had a large impact on
current salaries. Although inclusion of job title controls tended to reduce
the magnitude of the gender coefficient in the current salary equation,
such was not the case when gender differences in starting salaries were
taken into account.
Future research of at least two kinds would be helpful. First,
replications in other organizations would help establish the external
validity of the present findings. Given that (a) the findings pertaining
to human capital are consistent with research using national survey data
(see Cain, 1986), and (b) the firm studied is typical of other large firms
in its human resource practices, it seems likely that other studies will
find similar results.
Second, we need to better understand why women's starting salaries
are lower despite similarities in educational attainment, field of study,
and potential experience. As discussed earlier, because of the relative
lack of information available to employers, hiring and compensation
decisions regarding individual applicants may be especially susceptible
to the effect of group stereotypes (Nieva & Gutek, 1980; Tosi & Einbender,
1985). Some research also suggests that women may have lower pay
expectations than men for the same inputs (Major, McFarlin, & Gagnin, 1984).
If true, women may be less willing than men to bargain for a higher starting
salary. Of course, if as some evidence indicates (Olian et al.,
forthcoming), discrimination against women in hiring does exist, temporary
acceptance of lower starting salaries by women could be viewed as a rational
strategy to gain access to the firm and an opportunity to demonstrate their
17
true productivity (Aigner & Cain, 1977; Cain, 1986).
On the supply side, information also plays an important role. For
example, differing amounts and types of information held by applicants
(versus current employees) may contribute to the use of different comparison
standards by the two groups. As an applicant, search costs constrain the
amount of information gathered on jobs and their attributes (Stigler, 1962).
In particular, much information is difficult to obtain without first being
employed for a time, making many types of social comparisons difficult.
In contrast, once employed, within large firms, personnel practices tend
to be highly standardized. It is then comparatively easy to draw
comparisons between one's own pay vis-a-vis perceived relevant inputs (e.g.
job title, education, performance) and the pay of others given the relevant
inputs they are perceived to have. Any disparity is likely to produce
feelings of inequity and pressure for change (e.g., Adams, 1963). Combined
with legal pressures for affirmative action, this increased access to and
visibility of information may contribute to less persistence of unexplained
pay shortfalls for women once within the firm.
18
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Footnotes
1.1 am grateful to the National Research Council/National Academy of
Sciences for funding an earlier stage of the present research project.
I also thank George Milkovich for providing generous access to the data.
2.Based on a survey of personnel and industrial relations executives, the
Bureau of National Affairs (19B3) concluded that performance appraisal
results are used by B6% of firms for making salary increase decisions and
by 79% of firms for making promotion decisions concerning their white collar
workers.
3.The irony is that the firm that discriminates in the short run by paying
lower starting salaries to members of the disadvantaged group helps reduce
discrimination in the long run by driving up salaries for this group.
4.Accuracy refers to less dispersion of observed productivity about the
prediction line or surface (or a lower conditional variance). Thus, one
index of accuracy is the R2.
5.Some of these data were also used by Gerhart and Milkovich (19B7) in
their study of promotions and salary growth.
6.Cain (19B6) has argued that supervisory ratings of performance are not
"admissible" because they "might reflect discrimination". However, the
empirical evidence does not support this hypothesis, despite the fact that
a large amount of both laboratory and field research has been devoted to
thi~ question (see Dipboye, 19B5 for a review).
7.A Bureau of National Affairs (19B5) survey found that among firms with
over 1000 employees, over 60% included EEO in their manager training
programs. Further, EEO was the 4th (of 19) -most commonly included issue
in such programs.
B.The necessary detailed historical data was not available prior to 1976.
9.This measure is an imperfect proxy for persons with intermittent labor
force attachment (e.g. women who leave the labor force to bear and raise
children). Gerhart and Milkovich (19B7), however, found evidence that
the measure was not a problem in a similar sample, perhaps because of the
strong labor force attachment of professional and managerial women. See
also footnote #10.
10.Year of hire and firm tenure are both included because they are not
identical. Firm tenure is based on the date used for calculating benefits.
The latter date can differ from the original hire date. Firm tenure, then,
should give an accurate indication of the amount of actual time spent with
the firm even for persons not continuously employed with the firm.
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II.Experience and age differences between men and women at the time of
hire do not correspond to differences in 1986 because somewhat different
numbers of men and women were hired in different years.
12.Additional analyses indicated that most separations were voluntary and
that these voluntary quits were also more likely among low performers.
13.A test for an interaction between gender and average performance ratings
revealed no statistically significant effect.
14.The number employed as of 1984 is 6581 (8344 - 1763). This number
exceeds 1986 employment (4617) for several reasons. First, and most
important, recall that the data sets were generated separately (and at
different points in time). Therefore, despite our best efforts, they are
not strictly comparable. Second, for most large firms, the mid-1980s
represented a time of slow or negative employment growth. For example,
a recent survey of firms by the Employment Management Association reported
in Human Resource Management News (1987) found that 79.1% of responding
firms had downsized during the previous five years. In these firms,
cutbacks resulted in the dropping of, on average, 18% of their workforces.
Exemp~ employees were the most frequent targets of cuts in these firms.
The firm we studied was typical in these respects. Thus, relatively few
people were hired during the 1984-1986 period. Even with normal levels
of attrition, the result would be lower employment in 1986.
Full Sample College Graduates Sample
Starting CUrrent N Starting CUrrent N
Salary Salary Salary Salary
Men 29,265 40,251 3,564 30,093 42,153 2,280
Women 25,043 37,239 1,053 26,894 37,764 615
Women/Men .86 . .93 .89 .90
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TABLE 1
Mean Starting and CUrrent Salaries
;
t
i
,
!
I
1
!
I
,
I
!
I
I
I
!
I
i
1
i
I
I
Full Sample College Graduates
Current Salary Starting Salary Current Salary Starting Salary
Variables Coeff R2 Coeff R2 Coeff R2 Coeff R2
.123 .'118 .189 .166 .094 .198 .133 .111
HC .098 .367 .146 .423 .070 .410 .095 .376
HC, Major .086 .404 .122 .473 .046 .481 .048 .507
HC, Major, Tenure .086 .405 .044 .485
HC, Major, Tenure .089 .460 .042 .556
Average performance
rating
HC, foIajor, Tenure, .058 .675 .029 .757
Average performance
rating, Title
Sample size 4617 2895
All gender coefficients are statistically significant (p < .001).
All regressions include dummy variables for year of hire.
Table 2
Gender Coefficient and R2 under Different Reduced Form Specifications
N
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TABLE 3
Simu 1 taneous Models for CUrrent and Starting Salary, Two Stage Least Squares, Full Sample
Variables Starting Current CUrrent Starting Current CUrrent
Salary Salary Salary Salary Salary Salary
Intercept 9,.61Sb 5.011 7.934 9.532 4.830 7.791
(.018)C (.108) (.105) (.018) ( .108) (.103)
Gender .087 .059 .122 .029 .030
( .005) ( .004 ) ( .009) ( .005) ( .004 )
Starting Salary (predicted)'" .487 .237 .508 .252
(.010) (.010) (.010) ( .010)
Tenure .045 .020 .046 .022
( .001) (.001) ( .001) (.001)
Tenure Squared -.002 -.001 -.002 -.001
(.0001) (.0001) ( .0001) (.0001)
Average performance rating .142 .082 .144 .084
( .006) ( .005) ( . 006) ( .005)
Job Title Dummies NO YES NO YES
R2
.451 .458 .700 .473 .471 .704
N = 4617
Note: All coefficients are statistically significant (p < .001). Each starting salary equation includes year of hire
dummy variables, education degree dummy variables, potential experience (and its square), and college major dummy
variables. Gender is included where noted in the table.
aPredicted value for starting salary using variables described in general note.
bRegression coefficients.
CStandard errors
Nl./1
Variables Starting Current CUrrent Starting Current CUrrent
Salary Salary Salary Salary Salary Salary
Intercept 9.924b 4.297 7 .077 9.888 4.194 7.043
(.021)C (.134) (.140) (.022) (.137) (.142)
Gender .038 .032 .048 .0l4d .017
(.006) (.004) (.009) (.006) ( .005 )
Starting Salary (predicted)8 .553 .317 .565 .321
(.013) (.013) (.013) (.005)
Tenure .054 .024 .055 .025
(.002) ( .001 ) (.002) (.001)
Tenure Squared -.002 -.001 -.002 -.001
(.0001) ( .000 1) (.0001) (.0001)
Average performance rating .155 .089 .156 .089
(.006) (.005) (.006) (.005)
Job Title Dummies NO YES NO YES
R2
.502 .578 .772 .507 .577 .772
TABLE 4
Simultaneous Models for CUrrent and Starting Salary, Two Stage Least Squares, Co\lege Graduates Sample
N = 2895
Note: All coefficients are statistically significant (p < .001), except as noted.
includes year of hire dummy variables, education degree dummy variables, potential
college major dummy variables. Gender is included where noted in the table.
aPredicted value for starting salary using variables described in general note.
bRegression coefficients.
CStandard errors
dStatistically significant at p < .05.
Each starting salary equation
experience (and its square), and
N0\
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Table5
Probit Estimates for Sample Selection Equation, 1976--1984 Supplemental Data
Variable (1) (2)
,
Intercept .1251:>
( .525)C
5.269
(1.286)
Gender .139
(.040)
-5.931
(1. 380)
Age
-.048
(.014)
-0.046
(0.014)
Age squared (00)& .052
(.019)
0.050
(0.019)
Starting salary
-.039
(.051)
-0.550
(0.127)
Average performance rating .796
(.040)
0.789
(0.040)
Starting salary
*
gender 0.603
(0.137)
-2 Log likelihood ratio 1104.517 1124.042
Degrees of freedom 12 13
Note: Each model includes dummy
6581 stayers, Active status = 1;
&Divided by 100
bRegression coefficients
CStandard errors'
variables for year of hire;
1763 leavers, Active status = O.
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Table 6
Gender Coefficient with Correction for Sample Selection Bias, Two Stage Least Squares
Variables Starting CUrrent CUrrent Starting CUrrent CUrrent
, Salary Salary Salary Salary Salary Salary
Full Sample
Gender .090 .062 .126 .031 .033
(.005) (.004) (.009) (.005) (.005)
Inverse Mills .036 .049 .062 .093 .043 .059
Ratio (.032)a (.014) (.011) (.031) (.014) (.011)
Job Title NO NO YES NO NO YES
Dummies
R2
.452 .468 .703 .474 .472 .705
College Graduates Sample
Gender .042 .035 .055 .015 .020
(.006) (.005) (.010) (.006) (.005)
Inverse Mills .035 .022 .031 .087 .019 .029
Ratio (.031) (.015) (.012) (.032) (.015) (.012)
Job Title NO NO YES NO NO YES
Dummies
R2
.502 . .578 .773 .508 .577 .772
Note: The coefficients are based on equations identical to those used in
Tables 3 and 4, except that the inverse mills ratio is added as an explanatory
variable.
"Standard errors
Table 7
Decomposition of Starting Salary Differences, College Graduates
, Decomposition Standard
Men Women
Variables Total Endow Coeff Endow Coeff
Intercept -6% 0%
-6% 0% -6%
Year of hire 31% -5% 35% -12% 43%
Education degree 25% 14% 11% 15% 10%
Potential Experience 20% 6% 14% 4% 16%
College Major 30% 43%
-12% 46% -15%
Total 100% 58% 42% 53% 47%
MAJOR TOTAL ENDOW" COEFF
Mechanical Engineering 12% 13%
-1%
Electrical Engineering 8% 8%
-1%
Education 3% 4% -1%
Computer Science 1% 0% 1%
Chemical Engineering 1% 5%
-4%
Industrial Engineering 1% 2%
-1%
Business Admi~istration 0% 0% 0%
Chemistry
-1% -3% 2%
Math
-1% 0% -1%
Biology
-1% 1% -2%
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.Using men's coefficients as standard.
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